Higher Education and Citizenship: ‘The Full Range of Purposes’

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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses citizenship education in the context of the purposes and roles of higher education. The social and political changes in Europe of the last two decades have had an immense impact on the understanding of these roles and purposes, defining the university’s mission and steering the national systems of higher education. The dichotomy of economic competitiveness and social cohesion has been transferred into higher education discussions and provoked new dichotomies like the ‘Europe of the Euro’ vs. the ‘Europe of knowledge’. A call from the London Communiqué (2007) to focus on the ‘full range of purposes’ of higher education is taken as an indicative statement in recent policy debates and analysed. For this reason, four ‘archetypal models’ of understanding the purposes of higher education are developed against the historical background of the 19th and 20th centuries: Napoleonic, Humboldtian, Newmanian and Deweyan. Dewey’s criticism of the ‘educational state’ in the early 20th century are confronted with the later decline of the nation-state and with the processes of the internationalisation and globalisation of education and education policy. We are witness to the progressive instrumentalisation of higher education but higher education’s potential contribution to citizenship lies beyond this: in recognising the ‘full range of its purposes’.

Introduction: the ‘Europe of the Euro’ vs. the ‘Europe of knowledge’
The late 1980s and 1990s was a very dynamic yet also a very turbulent time in Europe. The Europeanisation process in the West took new steps reflected in both the EU enlargement (‘EU-15’) and in a broader political consensus (the Maastricht Treaty). In the same period, fundamental political changes occurred in Europe’s East, symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall. A process of ‘transition’ opened new pages in the reunifying Europe and awoke intensive
aspirations in the East to ‘rejoin Europe’. These processes contributed to a new meaning of the word. Europe as a whole (politically, socially and economically radically divided in the past) was no longer understood as a mere geographical entity. It began to shine in a new light: it is one and it is diverse – but its ‘diversity is our richness’. The reunifying Europe as a symbolic entity was again recognised as a value: a strong value which can motivate people in both the West and East, in the North and South. Indeed, this new sheen emitted slightly differently in various parts of the continent and this value could also be understood or interpreted differently.

Political and social expectations with regard to higher education substantially changed. On one hand, all countries were already challenged in one or another way by the phenomenon of mass higher education and the many problems linked to it. On the other, they were challenged by global trends in higher education and by the danger of lagging behind North America and also other parts of the world. Finally, the emerging ‘knowledge society’ began to suggest that ‘transition’ is not only something for the East and not merely political but that higher education is encountering a deep structural and conceptual change (Zgaga, 2007, p. 63ff).

The enhanced ‘Europeanisation’ process in Western parts of Europe combined with the political ‘transition’ process in its Eastern parts and ‘globalisation’ trends worldwide pushed European higher education into a situation which required a quite radical cut with extremely diverse national traditions. In a given atmosphere, the idea of building a common higher education and research area (EHEA, ERA)[1] was born and soon recognised as the new paradigm. Yet, from the beginning there have been diverse interpretations and expectations regarding the EHEA and ERA. The academic advantages were quite clear but what might be their broader implications? To develop a new, more inclusive paradigm of international coexistence on the basis of ‘European values’ by means of higher education? To contribute to a new European citizenship? Or perhaps to develop, on the basis of the new geographical divisions, a new, stronger competition among national systems and/or world regions that has not been seen before? New dilemmas were encountered. In ‘politically correct’ language they have most often been expressed in the dichotomy of ‘economic competitiveness’ vs. ‘social cohesion’.

This dichotomy is a general one; in various colours it glimmers between the lines of almost all European political messages of the last decade. This is perhaps the best known quotation: “The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (Lisbon European Council, 2000). Its echoes can be heard everywhere in contemporary European higher education policy debates. Yet, they have been verbalised in different ways. On one hand, during the 1990s and in accordance with the *Zeitgeist* an increased stress was put on the instrumental side of higher education. Understood as a “service” it was regarded as “the most dynamic segment of international trade”.[2] On the other hand, in a political initiative of 1998 which initiated the Bologna Process it was argued “that Europe is not only that of the Euro, of the banks and the economy” but “it must be a Europe of knowledge as well” (Sorbonne Declaration, 1998).

The dichotomy of ‘economic competitiveness’ versus. ‘social cohesion’ has deeply affected the understanding of the potential purpose(s) and role(s) of the modern university. Criticisms have been often made that higher education is now progressively understood ‘only as an economic drive’. On the other side, it has been also said that ‘higher education romanticism’ has no real
grounds and harms social and economic development.[3] Of course, the mutual objection of ‘one-sidedness’ (i.e., a dominance of one purpose/role of higher education and the neglect of any other purposes/roles) has been a matter of various considerations. Eight years after the idea of the EHEA had been confirmed in Bologna, we read in an important political message that higher education should be considered with regard to its “full range of purposes”. In the London Communiqué (2007), European ministers responsible for higher education agreed as follows:

“We recognise the important influence HEIs exert on developing our societies, based on their traditions as centres of learning, research, creativity and knowledge transfer as well as their key role in defining and transmitting the values on which our societies are built. Our aim is to ensure that our HEIs have the necessary resources to continue to fulfil their full range of purposes. Those purposes include: [a.] preparing students for life as active citizens in a democratic society; [b.] preparing students for their future careers and [c.] enabling their personal development; [d.] creating and maintaining a broad, advanced knowledge base; and stimulating research and innovation.”[4]

Interestingly, this list begins by stressing the citizenship purpose of higher education and not by setting out points of a more ‘popular’ nature. It appears unusual as we have been accustomed to education being ranked as ‘the most dynamic segment of trade’. In his contribution to this issue, Gert Biesta warns that adult education has become reduced to only one of its functions – ‘learning for earning’ – and this warning can easily also be broadened to include higher education. Like him, I would like to explore the particular potential of European Higher Education for the development of both national and European citizenship, but will do so by approaching it through the dichotomy sketched out above. To make it clear from the start: it is not my intention to diminish the importance of the ‘economic’ dimension of higher education and to favour its pure ‘social’ dimension. That would be childish. My presupposition is that the ‘full range of purposes’ (set out in the four points marked in the above quotation) is important. The idea holds an internal relationship to the dichotomy of the ‘Europe of the Euro’ vs. the ‘Europe of knowledge’ (Sorbonne Declaration, 1998) and, from today’s point of view, it seems necessary to reconsider this dichotomy against the background of historical trends and ideas concerning the role and purposes of higher education. This will be elaborated in the first part of my paper. As the London Communiqué (2007) reflects how current policy thinking is developing at the European level the second part will briefly analyse the trajectories of contemporary (higher) education policy.

**The Modern University: Four ‘Archetypal Models’**

One of the key questions in recent discussions has been what is and/or what should be higher education’s genuine ‘contribution to citizenship’. It is the point where it becomes most clear that the purposes of higher education and the role of institutions are a matter of public concern. Yet, I would like to reverse this traditional questioning by stressing that citizenship is a concept inherent to the idea of the university and the role of higher education. It is one of its ‘archetypes’ as I will argue below. I propose four ‘archetypal models’ to construct, on one hand, an ‘analytical tool’ to indicate which purposes are being stressed today in the EU context and, on the other, a ‘programmatic tool’ to contribute to a future agenda for higher education and citizenship in Europe.
A history of the university is also a history of the various understandings of the university’s mission, purposes and roles. There are several ways to classify possible models; they mainly follow the dominant practices of large national systems which proved to be influential and became traditional. For the purposes of this paper, I distinguish among four ‘archetypal models’. None of them can be associated with a single period of time, national context or distinguished scholar. There were concrete historical backgrounds against which each of these models was build and recognised. Yet, here we consider them in their structural rather than their historical emergence. It would be very difficult if not impossible to identify for instance a purely ‘national model’ of higher education. The actual way higher education is organised in a particular national context has always been an amalgamation of roles and purposes or, perhaps, of dominant aspects which can be deconstructed into ‘archetypal models’.

The turn from the 18th to 19th century was a cradle for the modern understanding of the purposes and roles of institutions as well as the emerging national systems of higher education in Europe. Compared to the Middle Ages, universities of the 17th and 18th centuries were seen as being in decline: “Voltaire described the university as an institution confined by scholasticism”; “the university disappeared with the other institutions of the ancient regime in the course of the French Revolution” (Rüegg, 1996, pp. 13-14). At the dawn of the new century, the university scene in Europe was “devastated”: “[i]n 1789, there had been 143 universities but by 1815 only 83 remained” (Rüegg, 2002, p. 44; Rüegg, 2004, p. 3). The university model as it appeared in Europe with the Reformation and Counter Reformation was now over (see e.g. Perkin 2006; Renaut 2002, Zonta 2002). However, like the mythical phoenix the university started to arise from its ashes in a new shape and with new models in the early 19th century.

The Napoleonic Model

At the start of the industrial society, universities as sites for training the clergy, lawyers and administrators of the classicism period became totally outmoded. With the decline of the post-Reformation university (i.e., its inability to respond to new challenges, if we employ a modern language) and with the progress of the Industrial Revolution new knowledge institutions – often not called universities – appeared to serve the needs of society. For example, in Britain ‘mechanics institutes’ were established to serve the artisan classes and to provide opportunities for the acquisition of useful skills not available in either traditional or in renewed universities of the time. Later, they focused more on the “theoretical sides of ‘the mechanical arts’” and some of them became universities after a time (Graham, 2002, p. 10). In France, the emerging new special colleges, in particular the grandes écoles, brought both – a response to the problems of the emerging industrial society and its economy as well as the prospect of raising the ‘cultural capital’ of the post-revolutionary bourgeois family (see e.g. Perkins, 2006, pp. 177-178; Renaut, 2002, p. 124).

“The Université was the only corporation which was refounded after the Revolution, but it had nothing in common with the university of the ancien régime” (Rüegg, 2004, p. 45). In its new shape it was rather “a corporation controlled by the state and incorporated into the hierarchy of the civil service” aiming at “three primary goals: first, to secure for the post-revolutionary state and its society the officials necessary for political and social stabilization; second, to make sure, that their education was carried out in harmony with the new social order and to prevent the emergence of new professional classes; and third, to impose limits on freedom of the intellect if
it seemed likely to prove dangerous to the state” (ibid.). This period was the time of shifting “from educating the ruling elite and its religious supporters to training a much wider range of leaders in industry, commerce, finance, expanding state bureaucracies, and the growing professions, including many kinds of engineering, accountancy, social administration, and education itself” (Perkin, 2006, p. 175).

It is impossible to attribute this trend only to France nor to just one emperor but, for various reasons, we nevertheless call this first model ‘Napoleonic’. From this point of view, the basic mission of the modern university – and other higher education institutions – is predominantly “to train students for their multiple, diverse future careers” if we borrow the language of the London Communiqué.

The Humboldtian Model
At this point, we usually encounter Wilhelm von Humbold and his challenging model based on Schleiermacher’s ideas and symbolised by the opening of the University of Berlin in 1810. It has a clear political context: Napoleon’s winning march across Europe. After the battle of Jena King Frederick William III declared that “[t]he state must replace by intellectual powers what it has lost in material ones” and he appointed von Humboldt to reform the Prussian education system (see Perkin, 2006, p. 177).

The key conceptual difference with regard to both the disappeared post-Reformation university as well as the new institutions following the ‘Napoleonic model’ is that the teaching of existing knowledge and the passing on of directly usable knowledge as the main role of ‘institutions of higher learning’ was now rejected. The new concept “was directed against both the utilitarian ideology embodied by the specialist colleges and the pre-existing universities” (Renaut, 2002, p. 122). The main task was to demonstrate how knowledge is discovered. “Higher institutions of learning” as von Humboldt wrote, “treat all knowledge as a not yet wholly solved problem […] in contrast to the schools, which take as their subject only the completed and agreed upon results of knowledge”; therefore, in higher institutions, “the teacher no longer exists for the sake of the student; both exist for the sake of learning” (see von Humboldt, 1963).

The stress is thus given to learning understood as theoretical work: the highest forms of knowledge (Wissenschaft). The new mission would be impossible without freedom of teaching and learning, impossible without the autonomy of the university being granted by the political power. “Thus began one of the paradoxes of the modern university, that it increasingly came to depend on the state both for material support and for defense of its freedom from its most dangerous threat, the state.” (Perkin, 2006, p. 177) The birth of this new model was an original answer – made possible by German philosophy (see e.g. Kwiek, 2006) – to the specific situation of Germany during the first decade of the 19th century although it also proved to be a success story in the next decades. German universities marked the centre of scientific progress and contributed immensely to the nation’s recovery and the new political and economic strength characteristic of the 19th century as a whole. The new model also served as a strongly influential example abroad. It was transferred – although frequently reinterpreted in different ways – to other European countries as well as other parts of the globe. Its elements (albeit heterogeneous and reinterpreted) have remained vital until today and we recognise the ‘Humboldtian model’ in them.
According to this ‘archetypal model’ the role of universities is – again using the language of the London Communiqué – to “create and maintain a broad, advanced knowledge base and to stimulate research and innovation”.

The Newmanian Model

The training of professionals to protect and develop the nation-state and undertaking basic research in autonomous institutions were not the only answers to new challenges of the industrial age. Changes in understanding the purposes and roles of higher education in modern times were intensified by other disputes, e.g. disputes on ‘narrowness’ versus ‘broadness’ in higher education, on ‘a specialist’ versus ‘a man’ (‘a gentleman’), on ‘developing knowledge and skills’ versus the ‘cultivation of intellect’, on utilitarian versus liberal education etc. In the 19th century a strong trend in argumentation emerged in which it is argued that the “process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education”. [5] In more specific words of the author: “If then I am arguing, and shall argue, against Professional or Scientific knowledge as the sufficient end of University Education (...) I say that cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace to every work and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number.” Professional interests are not rejected but postponed “to the formation of the citizen” (Newman, 1996, pp. 109, 118-119).

Indeed, these quotations seem still fresh and today we can also find quite similar normative statements on trends in higher education: universities should care (more) about raising the ‘intellectual tone of society’, ‘cultivate the public mind’, ‘contribute to democratic society’ etc. Parallels can also be found between Newman’s arguments and arguments of today (or even yesterday). [6] However, sometimes the similarities are only superficial. Without an intention to attribute this paradigm solely to either one scholar (Newman), period of time (mid-19th century) or geographical area (Ireland, Britain), we call this third model the ‘Newmanian’ model. As was expressed in the London Communiqué, the core mission of a university under this perspective is “to enable students’ personal development”.

The Deweyan Model

One of those seemingly similar but in substance quite differently elaborated topics is the claim that universities can and should contribute to the development of citizenship. Verbalised in this way, this is a new claim: citizenship in (higher) education is an issue which broadly entered discussions in the 1990s (Annette, 2000, p. 111). Yet, these discussions have a long pre-history and their topic could be a problem in itself. It would not be difficult to provide ample historical evidence that universities cannot be immune from serving as part of the state’s ideological apparatus and to provide a relatively instrumental mode of citizenship education. At least, this was often practiced during the last two centuries as we discuss here and remains an issue today.

North America cannot be excluded from this trend (e.g., noting the work of Michael W. Apple on curriculum and ideology; see Apple, 1979). However, this issue has been partly developed in quite a different context. In North America, higher education has never been understood as a
predominantly ‘state affair’. [7] Its ‘service to the community’ (“a service learning movement”; see AACU, 2007, p. 38) has deep roots and ‘liberal education’ has been kept legitimate as “the kinds of learning needed for a free society and for the full development of human talent” (ibid, p. 3). Here we find – reconsidering and acknowledging past debates as well – some material to construct our fourth model. How should we name it? With the first three ‘archetypal models’ we used European names (an emperor and two scholars). As the development of higher education in the USA has been as important and globally influential as the European one, we choose an American – the distinguished philosopher of education, John Dewey. This does not mean that we would like to attribute to him more than he deserves but, in doing this, we would first like to pay homage to his academic work on the relationship between (higher) education and democracy and, second, to symbolically label with his name this specific fibre of modern higher education.

Therefore, this is the ‘Deweyan model’. From this optics, the primary purpose and role of the university is to serve the surrounding community and to “prepare students for life as active citizens in a democratic society” as was expressed in the London Communiqué.

Archetypal Models as Analytical Tools

In conclusion, it is necessary to reiterate that our ‘archetypal models’ should not be taken as fixed and isolated patterns to be followed by a specific system or institution. On the contrary, in practice they are always intertwined, combined and mixed – but one of them usually takes the lead. It is only in this limited framework that we can speak of ‘German’, ‘French’, ‘British’ etc. models as developed in historical contexts. For example, the ‘Humboldtian’ model is not based exclusively on the concept of the ‘research university’ without reference to other concepts as is today often exaggerated. It is intertwined with heterogeneous elements, e.g.: the idea of a ‘national university’, that is, serving (even saving) the nation and the national culture, accommodating its political, economic and social needs (partly ‘Napoleonic’, partly Deweyan and partly Newmanian components); the idea of ‘Algemeine Bildung’, that is, providing “guidance for youth” (see Humboldt 1963) and caring about personal development (Newmanian and partly Deweyan components). Finally, there was also a relatively direct link to the concept of citizenship: “If the state and the nation are to be restored at all, they thought, the state must cease to be looked upon exclusively as a concern of the dynasty, and must come to be regarded as quite as much an affair of the people themselves” (see Paulsen, in: Wertz, 1996).

Similar arguments could be provided for the other three models when observed in a concrete setting. They are historically developed combinations of the four ‘archetypal models’. In fact, we can identify explicit or implicit citizenship components within each model. Therefore, all modern higher education systems as well as institutions reflect these ‘archetypal models’; yet, their individual shares (quantity aspect) and their interpretations (quality aspect) may differ a lot. This is a major point in contemporary disputes on higher education and its future. But why does today the share of the fourth – and even the third – ‘archetypal model’ appear quite disregarded in this context?

The ‘Educational State’ and its Transformations

In Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) there is an interesting passage which I cannot omit here. This is an analysis of conceptual shifts and practical developments in European educational systems of the 19th century. When he discusses “Education as National and as Social” (Chapter
VII), he points out the conceptual difference between the “individualistic” understanding of education of the (late) 18th century and the “nationalistic” concept which appeared in the (early) 19th century.

“So far as Europe was concerned, the historic situation identified the movement for a state-supported education with the nationalistic movement in political life”, he writes. He returns to Rousseau saying that “[t]o form the citizen, not the ‘man’, became the aim of education”. The context he is speaking about is provided by the Napoleonic conquests, “especially in Germany”, where it was widely believed that in the given situation attention to education is the best means of recovering the political integrity and power. In these new circumstances, a new goal of education was born: “the schools system, from the elementary grades through the university faculties, supplied the patriotic citizen and soldier and the future state official and administrator and furnished the means for military, industrial and political defense and expansion” etc. (Dewey, 2004, pp. 89-90).

The shift from the 18th to the 19th century also represents a shift in educational ideas and concepts. It is a relatively complex one. In Dewey’s eyes it results from two sources. “The educational process was taken to be one of disciplinary training rather than of personal development. Since, however, the ideal of culture as complete development of personality persisted, educational philosophy attempted a reconciliation of the two ideas. The reconciliation took the form of the conception of the ‘organic’ character of the state.” Now, Dewey briefly yet critically analyses German classical idealism and states “that the chief function of the state is educational. [...] In this spirit, Germany was the first country to undertake a public, universal, and compulsory system of education extending from the primary school through the university, and to submit to jealous state regulation and supervision all private educational enterprises.” (ibid., pp. 90-92)

On one hand, Dewey argues that “[i]n Europe, in the Continental states consequently, the new idea of importance of education for human welfare and progress was captured by national interests and harnessed to do a work whose social aim was definitely narrow and exclusive.” It should be reminded that these pages were written during the cruellest period of World War I. On the other hand, “science, commerce, and art transcend national boundaries. They are largely international in quality and method” (ibid., p. 93). Finally, Dewey asks a question which reaches well beyond the horizons of his time. “This contradiction (...) between the wider sphere of associated and mutually helpful social life and the narrower sphere of exclusive and hence potentially hostile pursuits and purposes, exacts of educational theory a clearer conception of the meaning of ‘social’ as a function and test of education than has yet been attained. Is it possible for an educational system to be conducted by the nation-state and yet the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained and corrupted?” (ibid., p. 94).

Dewey refers to an issue which is not totally unknown today. How to get away with the hegemonic role of the state in education? Due to this paper’s limited space and due to the changed historical contexts it would be difficult to connect it directly to Dewey’s argumentation, but since the last quarter of the 20th century there has been growing evidence that the ‘educational state’ in Europe has been melting away – or at least that the ‘educational state’ has significantly changed. This transformation is significant for our discussion. Sketching it out
briefly, the main feature of this transformation is linked to the decline of the nation-state as was characteristic of previous times. The ‘national’ has been increasingly challenged by the ‘transnational’ and ‘global’. In the last few decades, international politics have brought down borders between political blocs, global agreements in trade have brought down borders between economic areas and mutual accords on the recognition of qualifications have brought down borders between systems of educational qualifications. I do not say that these processes have been always parallel or conceptualised against the same horizon, but they are rooted in the same period. There are tensions within them which we should not let go. The ‘global’ (as opposite to the ‘national’) seems to be charged with contradictory elements. For example, ‘global interests’ can either be to increase profits on a transnational basis or to enhance mutual understanding and living together across national or ethnic or religious etc. divides – or to move borders of knowledge further on.

Two processes are particularly interesting. On one hand, there is ‘Europeanisation’ with its effects on education and training systems in European (i.e. EU as well as non-EU) countries. On the other, it is the internationalisation of education and educational policy in Europe as well as worldwide. These two processes have enormously influenced (higher) education ideas as formulated in recent decades; they have also contributed to new contradictions which, if we return to Dewey, also today “exact of educational theory a clearer conception of the meaning of ‘social’” (including ‘social cohesion’). Let us focus on some well echoed policy reports and/or documents to test this statement.

It is well known that the ‘Europeanisation’ process started with coal and iron, not with schools and universities. Yet, there has always been a ‘surplus’ in this process which can only be expressed in ‘softer’ terms than coal and iron. Recently, Anne Corbett told us a detailed story “about the process of ‘europeanising’ policy for higher education” and “‘europeanisation’ of national policy-making” (Corbett, 2006, p. 5). “The received view is that the Commission had nothing to do with universities […]. The policy sector was ‘taboo’ […], because national governments had not given the Community competence for education”. However, already in the 1970s, “the first Community education activity was opportunistically rooted in vocational training and the education of migrant workers’ children” and in the 1980s we witnessed a boom of EC programmes – e.g. the ‘famous’ Erasmus programme. “The Community subsidiary competence in education was defined for the first time by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991” (ibid., pp. 10-11).

During the same period, an important – today often forgotten – policy document was drafted: Memorandum on Higher Education in the European Community. It was stressed in the Foreword: “The growth of this European context in higher education and advanced training is assuming a strategic importance to the European Community in the light of the completion of the Internal Market, the movements towards political union and the global challenges which must be met by the European Economy.” The text of Memorandum (i.e., its Executive Summary) starts with saying that “the labour market is demanding more people with higher levels of knowledge and skill in order to support an expanding knowledge-based economy” (Commission of the EC, 1991, p. I; emph. in original).
This is the prevailing tune of the document. As there was no mandate to enter the domain of national culture (i.e. ‘soft’ elements like education), the direction which was ‘left free’ led towards the market and economy. Nevertheless, at the end of the introductory passage (“The Role of Higher Education”) this approach was broadened: “Higher education exercises an important role not only in safeguarding and developing European cultural heritage, but also in ensuring that this is transmitted and shared more widely among citizens and across the boundaries of Member States. In this way it helps to cultivate a ‘European’ affiliation which can cohabit with national and regional allegiances” (Commission of the EC, 1991, p. II). Thus, the economic approach to higher education encounters the dichotomy of ‘national culture’ vs. ‘European Culture’ and, even more, parallel to ‘national citizenship’ ‘European citizenship’ also has to be addressed. The dichotomy of the ‘Europe of the Euro’ vs. the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ (1998) is obviously an older one. In fact, it emerged on the margins of a much broader policy discussion in the late 1980s. We will try to indicate the main lines of this discussion by drawing upon two important reports which both appeared in the mid-1990s within two important international organisations – the UNESCO and the OECD.

The UNESCO responded to contemporary global challenges with a report “on Education for the Twenty-first Century”. The report group (1993-1996) was headed by Jacques Delors, a French economist and politician, a two-term President of the European Commission (1985-1995) who had a long-standing interest in education. The Delors Report starts by evaluating the 20th century and states that “[a]t the dawn of a new century […] it is essential that all people with a sense of responsibility turn their attention to both the aims and the means of education” (Delors, 1996, p. 14). It continues by stressing a number of tensions, including “the tension between, on one hand, the need for competition, and on the other, the concern for equality of opportunity” (ibid., pp. 16-17) which we have to confront, reconcile and overcome. “This has led us, within the terms of reference of the report, to rethink and update the concept of lifelong learning so as to reconcile three forces: competition, which provides incentives; co-operation, which gives strength; and solidarity, which unites” (ibid., p. 18). If we help ourselves with Dewey’s formulation, the reconciliation took the form of the conception of the ‘learning society’ and ‘lifelong learning’ and the latter “emerges as one of the keys to the twenty-first century” (ibid., p. 22). At this point, the Report introduces the famous metaphor of the ‘four pillars’: “learning to live together”, “learning to know”, “learning to do” and – referring to another well-known earlier UNESCO report (Faure, 1972) – “learning to be” (Delors, 1996, pp. 22-23). This metaphor is somewhat reminiscent of our ‘archetypes’.

The Report refers to education in general but there are also some direct hints regarding higher education. Universities can contribute “by diversifying what they offer” and in going this way they “would transcend what is wrongly held to be the conflict between the logic of public service and the logic of the job market. They would also reclaim their intellectual and social vocation as, in a sense, guarantors of universal values and the cultural capital heritage. The [Delors’] Commission sees these as cogent reasons for urging greater university autonomy” (ibid., pp. 27-28). In this fragment, all four ‘archetypal models’ – and ‘the whole range of purposes’ – can be recognised; they are put together, although verbalised in a different way (see e.g. ibid, p. 131).

It should not be a surprise that UNESCO, as an international organisation with a specific philosophy, was responding to challenges to education at the turn of the millennium in this way.
Its mission has been ‘humanistic’ and not ‘economic’. To make the picture of possible responses more colourful we should search for another mode of responding to them. UNESCO has always been concerned with global issues and the complex problems of so-called developing countries which have a specific weight in education and culture. These issues – taken in their predominantly economic dimension – have also been constantly addressed by other international organisations, e.g. the World Bank and the OECD. Here we can track an ‘alternative philosophy’. In a clear and well-elaborated way it can be illustrated by an OECD background report on “Lifelong learning for all” (OECD, 1996) which timely appeared parallel to the Delors Report.

Within this report again, “[l]ifelong learning offers an appropriate framework for addressing these issues” and “is geared to serve several objectives: to foster personal development, including the use of time outside of work (including in retirement); to strengthen democratic values; to cultivate community life; to maintain social cohesion and to promote innovation, productivity and economic growth” (OECD, 1996, p. 15). This “view of learning” is all-embracing; it includes “schools, vocational, tertiary and adult education institutions”, formal as well as non-formal learning. Nevertheless, a contour of the four ‘archetypal models’ can again be sensed here. It is perhaps only a little unexpected that in an economic organisation’s report “innovation, productivity and economic growth” are left to the very end. Yet later, they come to the forefront while the analyses of ‘soft purposes’ of education disappear; successive chapters focus on “learning economics and societies”, “lifelong learning and work”, “the role of government”, “goals and standards”, “resources” and, finally, “how to pay”. It seems that ‘soft purposes’ have been overshadowed by ‘hard’ ones and that they have instead become a means to an end – the end: economic growth. Schematically put, a relationship between the UNESCO and the OECD philosophy of education and learning can be sketched as a relationship between the ‘treasure within’ and ‘economic growth’.

There is an obvious difference in both approaches. On the one hand, identifying tensions and trying to overcome them in a complex setting – global vs. local; universal vs. individual; tradition vs. modernity etc. (Delors, 1996, p. 17). On the other hand, identifying “the long-term contextual changes – challenges and opportunities – faced by education and training systems” and painting a picture of ongoing trends – “all parts of the drive towards the post-industrial information society” (OECD, 1996, p. 29). Again speaking schematically, these fragments illustrate a difference between the ‘philosophical’ and the ‘economist’ or perhaps ‘technocratic’ discourses. At the turn of the millennium, it seems that education has become a hegemonic object of the latter: at least in contemporary education policy documents these discourses obviously take a leading position (see e.g. Eurydice, 2000).

From State to Market Control: Consumerism Instead of Citizenship?
Economic growth always needs social cohesion as a companion. ‘De-cohesion’ – i.e. fractured, opposing and conflicting social settings (which are, in fact, very often just collateral damage of economic growth) – would harm it. The instrumental concept of social cohesion is obviously a contradictory one. A reconciliation between growth and its collateral damage cannot be achieved in pure instrumental terms and the idea of social cohesion cannot be reduced to means only. The perspective of a value ‘an sich’ offers an alternative approach. Values, identities, symbols etc. play a constitutive role in society and cannot be dissolved into means completely and without
remnants: they persist – in a ‘conflictual consensus’ (see the contribution of Biesta in this issue) – as the ‘irreducible core’ of societies. When Palle Rasmussen recently disputed the dichotomy of the UNESCO and OECD approaches he noted: “Underpinning most Western educational approaches is the view that learning is not just a question of developing resources and acquiring skills. It is also a process of acquiring and developing a social, cultural and personal identity. To use the German term, it is a process of ‘Bildung’.” (Rasmussen, 2006, p. 172)

In the 1990s it became clear that the process of transmitting certain traditional ‘mandates’ of nation-states to international or supranational bodies could not be solely retained for coal and iron nor security or monetary issues. Education was jealously kept as a national affair but in a context of progressing global competition – as well as broadening international co-operation – the ‘educational state’ had to consider its (relative) withdrawal. In the last quarter of the 20th century, “[t]he main focus was on reforms in institutional management linked to the increase in autonomy granted to higher education institutions and to the reinforcement of links with the economic environment” (Eurydice, 2000, pp. 24-25). On the other hand, the nation-state also started to withdraw from ‘autonomous’ policy making. Since then, policy development has been progressively lifted to an international level and ‘agreed principles’(such as e.g. the ‘Bologna’ ones) have been implemented nationally as a result.

Yet, as can be illustrated at least by the EU case and the ‘subsidiarity principle’, international bodies have not directly started steering national educational systems. Since the ideal of (predominantly national) culture persists, a reconciliation of the two inherently opposite ideas, viz., reinforcement of links with the economy on a global scale and the preservation of national identity and traditions, had to be put on the European agenda. This is what sheds some new light on emerging dichotomies like ‘competition’ vs. ‘cohesion’, ‘Euro’ vs. ‘knowledge’, ‘global’ vs. ‘international’, ‘economy’ vs. ‘philosophy’ etc.

Dewey also reminded us that “science, commerce and art transcend national boundaries”. In essence, nothing has changed until today. Knowledge does not respect boundaries – by definition it is ‘international’, ‘universal’ – and capital does not respect them either. It seems that such disrespect is needed to found concepts like ‘development’ and ‘progress’. But when both ‘disrespectable actors’ meet each another there may be a collision e.g. seen in “attempts by drug companies to suppress unfavourable findings by university scientists” (Bok, 2003, p. 72). In such cases, the state behaves quite reservedly today and tries to convince citizens that these processes occur beyond its borders – or behind its back. Again using Dewey’s language, a new shift is on its way: a shift from the ‘nationalistic’ concept of education of the 19th and 20th centuries to a new ‘international’ and/or ‘global’ understanding of education of the late 20th century. This shift has had a broad range of significant effects, including its influence on citizenship education. Yet, it is not a straightforward process; it requires us to respond in terms of ‘either – or’.

What do we actually mean today with citizenship education? Most often, it is understood as contributing to special abilities as e.g. social and moral responsibility, critically thinking, acting deliberately in a pluralist world, political literacy, participation in politics and civil society etc. The idea that (higher) education is an instrument of the ‘educational state’ – i.e. an instrument of submitting a man “to the educative discipline of state institutions and laws” (Dewey, 2004, p. 92) – seems surpassed, left behind and even disgusting today. Yet is that so? It would not be so
difficult to prove that certain elements of the – deeply transformed – ‘educational state’ persist. But this is not the main consideration. In higher education, a particular ambivalent situation has been constructed: on one hand, it is supposed that universities are ‘free’ of the traditional state control; on the other, they are ‘free to link with the economic environment’. The new market control may be observed as a substitute of the previous one. Instead of the ‘educational state’ there is the emerging ‘educational market’: quite a national one in secondary education but a progressing international and global one in higher education.

This should be treated as a major issue with regard to the ‘Deweyan model’ and a noble aim “to prepare students for life as active citizens in a democratic society” in general. In the situation just described it is not only political actors that can be blamed for neglecting the ‘soft’ purposes of higher education but also academic ones. Derek Bok, a former President of Harvard University, was very clear about this: “If there is an intellectual confusion in the academy that encourages commercialization, it is confusion over means rather than ends. To keep profit-seeking within reasonable bounds, a university must have a clear sense of the values needed to pursue its goals with a high degree of quality and integrity. When the values become blurred and begin to lose their hold, the urge to make money quickly spreads throughout the institution.” (Bok, 2005, p. 6) His statement can help in answering the question of why the share of the fourth ‘archetypal model’ may appear to be disregarded. The more a mission of an institution becomes instrumental, the harder it is to protect values ‘an sich’ as its basis (i.e., institutional autonomy; epistemological rigour etc.) and the harder it is to provide ‘a full range of its purposes’. We should not risk them in favour of ‘a profitable range of purposes’; at least not in higher education today.

Conclusions

In this paper I have tried to argue that citizenship is a concept inherent to the idea of the university and the role of higher education in general. Higher education’s contribution to citizenship does not need a push from the outside. It can – and should – be conceptualised as an integral fibre within the ‘full range of its purposes’. A higher education institution can make its citizenship contribution if ‘the full range of purposes’ is seriously taken into account when its mission is formulated and carefully implemented. The ‘citizenship function’ is not limited to the curriculum and cannot be exhausted in citizenship education alone. In this regard, e.g. access to higher education, in particular to certain academic disciplines and professions, is per se an issue with high civic potential. The same applies to the social, moral and political consequences of research etc. The ‘Deweyan archetype’ is not parallel to the other three; it transverses them.

However, the idea of the integral treatment of various purposes of higher education is not immune to an instrumental interpretation. The frequent use of the dichotomy of ‘economic development’ vs. ‘social cohesion’ suggests that there are means and ends, purposes of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ ranks. As Gert Biesta convincingly shows in his contribution in this issue, the concept of ‘active citizenship’ is quite deeply implicated in these nets: starting from private motivations it leads to a ‘consumerist’ form of citizenship. ‘Individualisation and the domestication of citizenship’ is a direct political threat to the concept of democracy. Yet it is also indirectly a threat to the concept of the university. Knowledge cannot be ‘individualised’ and ‘domesticated’ without very serious consequences as it has always been a result of collective learning based on conflict and contestation.
Since the beginning of the 19th century, the nation-state has been performing the role of the supreme authority in higher education. Humboldt invented a formula which protected universities from losing their right to mediate the highest forms of knowledge. With the decline of the nation-state and rise of the global market this formula lost its efficiency and institutional autonomy – and the values underlying it – is again endangered. Not only is the due contribution of higher education to citizenship necessary, but so too is a redefinition of the role of the state in public education, i.e. public responsibility for higher education (Weber & Bergan, 2005). This may also be part of the programmatic agenda for tomorrow.

Notes
[1] The European Higher Education Area (EHEA) was an initiative of the national ministers of higher education (the Bologna Process, 1999) while the European Research Area (ERA) was an initiative of the European Commission (2000).
[2] “The traditional framework of public service increasingly proved inappropriate for operating some of the most dynamic and innovative segments of the economy, and governments apparently lacked the entrepreneurial spirit and financial resources to exploit fully existing growth potential.” Quoted from a recent document: The General Agreement on Trade in Services. An Introduction. 29 March 2006. – The GATS ‘philosophy’ was a particularly frequent and hot topic in higher education discussions (not only in Europe) at the beginning of this decade.
[3] A brief remark should be made here. An approach which likes to draw the course of a history as an ongoing process toward a progressing ‘emptiness’ has, however, been known for centuries but does not seem to help in reconsidering the problems of today as it has never helped – according to my understanding – in redirecting the ‘wrong’ courses of human history. On the contrary, this approach has always been just the reverse side of the problematic, supposedly ‘empty’ present. In my understanding, a productive confrontation with the present can only lie beyond the dichotomy of ‘realism’ and ‘romanticism’. This dichotomy is not only characteristic for policy discourses but also for academic ones.
[4] It took quite a long time for this idea to finally enter a political document signed by 46 European education ministers. We can trace it from the reports of early official Bologna seminars or working groups, e.g. a seminar on recognition issues in the Bologna Process (Lisbon, April 2002; a document in the author’s archives), a seminar on employability (Bled, October 2004; a document in the author’s archives), a report from the Bologna Working Group on Qualifications Frameworks (December 2004; [Berg], 2005, p. 23). Documents prove that stressing ‘a full range of purposes in higher education’ was in particular pushed forward by the Council of Europe’s agenda (Bergan, 2004, p. 24; Weber and Bergan, 2005, pp. 27, 235; Kohler and Huber, 2006, pp. 13, 213) – an organisation which is not an ‘EU body’.
[5] Against this position, utilitarians “insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighted and measured. They argue as if every thing, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call making Education and Instruction ‘useful’ and ‘Utility’ becomes their watchword. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University; what is the real worth in the market for the article called ‘a Liberal Education’” (Newman, 1996, p. 110). On the other hand, Newman would not have subscribed to the Humbolditian model either: “In his eyes – and in the eyes of many 19th century university leaders – ‘research’ (to
which they often attached the adjective ‘useful’) did not form part of the core mission of the university […]. Research councils are a comparatively recent invention” (Scott, 2005, p. 55).

[6] Newman’s arguments (1859) look forward “to Habermas’ ideas about the public sphere. The university, he suggests, embodies and promotes the idea of a sphere in which equal participants can communicate free from domination. It thus creates the conditions for good and effective citizenship” (Donald, 1992, p. 147).

[7] “The overwhelming features of American higher education have been its diversity and its restless expansion. Not only could any person find any study but, particularly after the US Supreme Court ruled against New Hampshire’s attempt to impose state control on Darmouth College in 1819, any individual group, church, city, state, or private firm could found a college and open its doors to anyone willing to pay the tuition fees” (Perkin, 2006, p. 184).

References


